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Abstract 
 
This paper examines whether the consumption-income ratio is stationary in 50 African 
countries. We use the residual augmented least squares (RALS-LM) unit root test that allows 
for structural breaks developed by Meng et al. (2014). The empirical evidence shows that the 
consumption-income ratio is stationary around structural breaks in most (44 out of 50) 
African countries. This is consistent with the predictions of most economic theory. The 
general finding of mean reversion implies that (policy) shocks are likely to have only 
temporary effects on the consumption-income ratio in most African countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The general predictions of economic theory are that the consumption-income ratio tends 
towards a constant, which means that it should be stationary. However, numerous studies that 
have tested this proposition find evidence that it is not stationary. Determining whether the 
consumption-income ratio (and, hence, the savings rate) is stationary is of importance in the 
light of global imbalances across nations. For example, reduced savings (as well as budget 
deficits) is one cause of substantive trade deficits. This can raise the rate of interest and cause 
an appreciation in the exchange rate because foreign capital will likely finance investment 
demand. Ultimately this can adversely affect exports.  
 
Further, during different stages of the business cycle the way in which consumption (and 
savings) reacts to income changes may vary, especially in developing countries. In addition, 
various shocks that have occurred in African countries since the 1970s have forced the 
consumption-income ratio away from its long-run value (or even shifted that value). In an 
attempt to allow for this, we utilize unit root tests that can accommodate structural breaks.  
 
Household consumption expenditures account for the largest part of gross domestic product 
(GDP) in African countries. It absorbed more than 63% of the continent’s GDP in 2014, and 
in the same year, government expenditures and investment accounted for 15% and 22% of 
GDP, respectively (United Nations, 2016). In most countries, private consumption 
expenditure is the most stable part of aggregate demand. Investment and exports are known 
to become volatile when the average propensity to consume (APC) is declining. This causes 
GDP growth to greatly fluctuate (Abeysinghe and Choy, 2004). Therefore, any attempt to 
explain the African economy cannot overlook the importance of aggregate consumer 
behavior, including the behaviour and properties of the APC. 
 
Beyond the relevance of aggregate consumption and the APC in Africa, the relationship 
between consumption and income is one of the foundations of macroeconomics. The 
determination of the stochastic properties of the APC is worthwhile because it has significant 
implications for policy and econometric modelling as well as shedding light on the validity of 
the predictions of the major theories of consumer behaviour. A non-stationary APC implies 
that it is not mean reverting such that any shock will have a permanent effect and the APC 
will not return to its long-run equilibrium. In the case of adverse shocks, the authorities may 
wish to act to ensure that there is no permanent impact on the APC.  
 
We are not aware of any previous studies that test for a unit root, allowing for structural 
breaks, in the APC for a large number of African countries – Cerrato et al (2013) apply panel 
unit root tests to the APC to a sample of 57 nations that includes 7 African countries. We test 
for the presence of a unit root in the APC whilst taking account of structural breaks for 50 
African countries for the period 1970-2014. Hence, our first contribution is to test for a unit 
root in the APC for the largest number of African countries that has been considered to date. 
Our second contribution is to apply the Residual Augmented Least Squares (RALS) unit root 
test of Meng et al. (2014) that allows for the possibility of structural breaks and non-
normality. As far as we are aware, we are the first to apply this test to determine the order of 
integration of the APC for any country. The RALS unit root test accommodates information 
of non-normality, including asymmetry, non-linearity, and fat-tailed distributions (Meng et al. 
2014). As indicated above, the application of the RALS unit root test is particularly relevant 
in our work because it is known that many macroeconomic variables, including the APC, are 
affected by structural breaks (Cook, 2005). For example, the implementation of financial 
deregulation policies over several years in many nations can induce structural breaks in the 
APC due to variations in, for example, liquidity constraints and income uncertainty. Over the 
past few decades, several Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) nations have liberalized their financial 
systems, privatizing many government-owned commercial banks, therefore encouraging 
more foreign banks to enter and ensuring the purchase of foreign assets by domestic financial 
corporations (Moyo et al., 2014). Other policies introduced in African countries include the 
permission of offshore borrowing by domestic residents in the 1990s and the removal of 
restrictions on portfolio capital inflows. Further, the deregulation of interest rates in this 
monopolistic environment permitted banks to widen their margins such that real interest rates 
on bank deposits fell substantially (Pill and Pradhan, 1997). It is therefore appropriate that a 
method (such as the RALS approach) which allows for the possibility of structural breaks in 
the APC is employed.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature while the 
data and research methodology are discussed in section 3. In section 4 we present and discuss 
the empirical results. The conclusion of the study and its policy implications are given in 
section 5.  
 
2.Literature review 
 
Economic theory generally suggests that the APC is stationary. An implication of the 
Absolute Income Hypothesis (AIH) of Keynes (1936) is that the APC tends towards the 
marginal propensity to consume (MPC) as income grows. This suggests that the APC should 
decrease at a decreasing rate as income rises through time, and converge to a constant. 
Duesenberry’s (1949) Relative Income Hypothesis (RIH) implies that the APC will be 
constant if the income distribution remains constant, however, it will shift if the income 
distribution shifts (giving rise to possible structural breaks) or if the income distribution is 
trended the APC will also be trended. However, the equilibrium APC will be constant if the 
growth rate of consumption does not change according to the habit persistence version of the 
RIH. Friedman’s (1957) Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) implies a constant APC if 
transitory consumption and income as well as the proportionality coefficient remain 
unchanged over time. Modigliani’s (1986) version of the Life Cycle Hypothesis (LCH) 
implies that a country’s saving ratio is unrelated to its per-capita income and positively 
correlated to its rate of income growth. Thus, the aggregate APC will only change if the long-
run rate of income growth varies, otherwise it will be constant. Davidson et al. (1978) base 
their work on the notion that consumption is homogeneous of degree one in income. The 
implication is that the log of the APC tends towards a constant. Further, because aggregate 
consumption is not expected to exceed income for a prolonged period or go below zero it is 
not expected to diverge unboundedly.  
 
Models of consumer behaviour that do not assume certainty equivalence suggest that the 
APC may be nonstationary if there are changes income uncertainty that induce variations in 
precautionary savings. For example, Caballero (1990 and 1991), using such models, suggests 
that higher income uncertainty results in increased precautionary savings and a lower 
marginal propensity to consume (MPC). Further, if labour income and labour income 
innovations are positively correlated, the MPC will be lower than that predicted by certainty-
equivalence models. An implication regarding the APC is that if there are changes in a 
country’s economic environment that cause income uncertainty to change (or shift) this will 
cause a corresponding change (or shift) in the MPC and, therefore, the APC. This means that 
changes in a country’s income uncertainty implies that its APC may not be stationary or may 
only be stationary around a shifting mean. 
 
Overall, economic theory indicates that the APC is either constant or tends towards a constant 
suggesting a theoretical expectation for a stationary aggregate APC. However, the various 
theories also provide reasons for potential structural shifts in the APC suggesting that the 
APC may be most appropriately characterized as stationary around possible structural 
breaks.
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Previous tests of the order of integration of the aggregate APC include the following. Sarantis 
and Stewart (1999) applied the first generation Im et al. (2003) panel unit root test that does 
not allow for structural breaks to 20 OECD over the period 1957-1994. They found that the 
APC contains a unit root. Subsequently, Tsionas and Christopoulos (2002) found that the 
APC was stationary in at least one regime in 14 European Union countries for the period 
1960-1999 using a unit root test based on a threshold autoregression that allows for 
asymmetric adjustment. Cook (2003) applies the Shin and So (2001) unit root test that is 
more powerful than standard linear adjustment unit root tests, although it does not allow for 
structural breaks. He finds that the APC is non-stationary using UK quarterly data over the 
period 1955 - 2001. Using the Lee and Strazicich (2003, 2004) unit root tests that allow for 
up to two structural breaks, Cook (2005) found that the APC was stationary around breaks for 
20 OECD countries. Using time-series unit root tests with enhanced power and panel unit 
root tests that allow for cross-sectional dependence Romero-Ávila (2008) tested the order of 
integration of the APC in 23 OECD countries over the period 1960 to 2005. They conclude 
that the APC contains a unit root. We note that these tests do not allow for structural breaks. 
Using the same data for 23 OECD countries Romero-Ávila (2009) reinvestigated the unit root 
hypothesis of the APC. They found, using standard panel unit root tests that do not allow for 
structural breaks, that the APC appears to be nonstationary. However, when utilizing the 
Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2005) stationarity test that allows for structural breaks the APC is 
found to be stationary. Solarin (2017) investigated the nonstationarity of APC in the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members. The author employed several 
types of nonstationarity tests and the results show that APC is non-stationary in most of the 
countries. 
 
Using panel unit root tests that allow for heterogeneous autocorrelation across countries 
(though not structural breaks) Liao et al. (2011) find that the majority (22 out of 24) of OECD 
countries’ APCs are mean reverting using data over the period 1970 – 2006. Fallahi (2012) 
examined the unit root properties of the APC in 23 OECD nations over the period 1950–2007 
using bootstrapped confidence intervals to enhance the power of the tests. While there is 
evidence that the APC is stationary in some countries they find that it is non-stationary in 
most of the countries. Elmi and Ranjbar (2013) considered whether the APC exhibits mean 
reversion for 16 OECD countries over the period 1960 to 2010. They employed the Becker et 
al. (2006) test that has stationarity as the null hypothesis and that can control for structural 
breaks that have not been pre-specified using a flexible Fourier function. They find evident 
mean reversion of the APC in 12 out of the 16 OECD countries that they consider. Cerrato et 
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 Cerrato et al (2013) note that shifts in a range of factors (demographic factors, wealth, 
inflation, interest rates, income growth, income uncertainty, liquidity constraints and fiscal 
variables, etc.) can cause the APC to shift, giving rise to structural breaks.  
al. (2013) tested whether the APC contains a unit root in 24 OECD countries and 33 non-
OECD nations (including 7 African countries) over the period 1951–2003. Applying 2 types 
of panel unit root tests that allow for linear and nonlinear adjustment, respectively, they find 
evidence that the APC is nonstationary in the majority of nations (78% of OECD countries 
and 74% of non-OECD countries). 
 
The literature review above suggests the following. First, there are relatively few papers that 
have applied unit root and/or stationarity tests to the aggregate APC. Second, virtually all 
studies apply the tests to developed nations, especially OECD countries. We could only find 
one paper that includes unit root tests of African nations’ APC and in this paper only 7 
African countries are considered. This may partly be due to developed countries’ domination 
of global consumption and income. For instance, the share of western European countries’ 
household final consumption in global consumption was 18% in 1970 and 12% in 2014 
(World Bank, 2016). The focus on developed countries may also be due to constraints in 
obtaining sufficient data for developed countries – although such constraints are becoming 
less binding as time passes. Third, studies that use standard unit root tests generally find the 
APC to be nonstationary which, given the strong theoretical expectation that they are 
stationary, raises the suspicion that these findings may be erroneous and due to the low power 
of unit root tests. This has led many authors to consider methods that are less likely to 
produce erroneous inference by, for examples, using tests that specify the null as stationarity, 
allow for nonlinear adjustment, employ panel data and can accommodate structural breaks. 
The literature suggests that the tests that allow for structural breaks have clearly been the 
most successful in finding the APC to be stationary, as is expected by theory. 
 
We fill the gap in the literature on developing countries by applying unit root tests to the APC 
for 50 African countries. We also utilise a method that can accommodate structural breaks 
given that the previous literature (on mainly developed economies) suggests the need to 
account for these. 
 
3.Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Data 
 
We use annual data on the APC for 50 African countries over the period 1970-2014.
2
 These 
are derived from household consumption expenditures and GDP provided by the United 
Nations database.
 
This represents the longest time span available from the database when the 
series were extracted. These 50 countries are the only ones from Africa with consistent data 
for all 45 years.
3
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 The countries that we consider are: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote 
D’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
3
 The data for Tanzanian is only for the mainland of the country as the dataset for Zanzibar is 
not available. We have excluded Ethiopia, which is one of the largest countries in the 
continent, due to a lack of consistent data availability.  
Table-1 reports descriptive statistics for the logarithm of the APC (LAPC). The distribution 
of LAPC varies greatly across the countries. Of the 50 countries Lesotho (Equatorial Guinea) 
has the highest average (standard deviation) LAPC while Libya (Senegal) has the lowest 
average (standard deviation) LAPC. The Jarque-Bera statistics suggest that the null of 
normality can be rejected in 22 (or 44%) of the countries using a 10% level of significance. 
These countries are Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Republic, 
Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, 
Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia and Tanzania. 
 
A visual plot of aggregate consumption in Africa as a percentage of consumption in the 
world, Western Europe and the U.S is considered in Figure-1. This shows that the share of 
African consumption relative to consumption in the rest of the world, consumption in 
Western Europe and consumption in the U.S has been growing. It also shows that aggregate 
African consumption has increased from (see the right-hand scale of Figure-1) US$ 208 
billion in 1970 to US$ 1,079 in 2014 (United Nations, 2016). The rise in African 
consumption in both absolute and relative terms has been due to factors such as the 
population growth rate, a growing number of Africans of middle-class status, the rising pace 
of urbanization and the move towards digital technologies (Hattingh et al. 2012). There is a 
rising consumer base in most economies in Africa, steered by the populace in the middle-
class. Relative to Latin American countries, there is a higher percentage of young people in 
the total population in Africa (Deloitte 2014). Overall, this suggests a growing importance of 
African consumption in the world and that it is timely to examine economic aspects of this 
continent that have previously been primarily considered in developed countries. 
 
The graph tends to show breaks in the trend of consumption in Africa in the years, 2000, 
2006 and 2008. The year 2000 marks the beginning of when many African countries started 
recording reasonable economic growth, which is partly due to a significant rise in the prices 
received for primary products. The year 2006 coincided with a significant rise in the 
continents’ trade relationship with China. It resulted in a trebling of trade volumes between 
China and the African countries from $10 billion in 2002 to more than $40 billion in 2005 
and more than $50 billion in 2006 (Zafar, 2007). Hence, within 2006 alone there was a 25% 
increase in the trade volume between China and the countries in Africa. China is known to 
have widespread dealings in several countries in the continent. Chinese companies import oil 
from Angola and Sudan, Tea from Kenya, Nigeria timber from Central Africa, copper from 
Zambia as well as gold and platinum from South Africa. The year 2008 coincided with 
economic uncertainty associated with the decline in demand for raw materials produced in 
African countries resulting from the slowdown in the European and American markets. 
In Figure 2 and Figure 3, we plot the 50 African countries’ APCs against time (25 nations are 
depicted in each graph). We have normalized the series, using the z-score method. Whilst the 
APC declines for many countries, it is also relatively constant or even increasing in some 
countries. There also appears to be shifts in many of the countries’ plots that would be 
consistent with structural breaks. Hence, vertical lines that correspond to the structural breaks 
observed from the subsequent econometrics analysis have been added to the graphs. 
 
 
  
 
 
Table-1: Descriptive statistics for the APC in African countries 
Country  Mean  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis  Jarque-Bera 
Algeria -0.927 0.108 0.067 1.855 2.490 (0.288) 
Angola -0.979 0.273 -0.332 1.769 3.668 (0.160) 
Benin -0.138 0.161 0.445 1.724 4.537 (0.103) 
Botswana -0.719 0.255 0.573 2.078 4.054 (0.132) 
Burkina Faso -0.299 0.100 -0.324 2.339 1.605 (0.448) 
Burundi -0.061 0.063 -0.693 2.859 3.638 (0.162) 
Cabo Verde -0.478 0.054 1.543 7.349 53.306*** (0.000) 
Cameroon -0.329 0.043 0.222 2.381 1.086 (0.581) 
Central African Republic -0.383 0.193 -0.902 3.102 6.125** (0.047) 
Chad -0.109 0.248 0.107 1.291 5.560* (0.062) 
Comoros -0.365 0.144 0.209 1.354 5.404* (0.067) 
Congo Republic -1.234 0.168 -1.279 4.387 15.869*** (0.000) 
Cote D’Ivoire  -0.495 0.106 -0.237 3.391 0.709 (0.701) 
Democratic Republic of the Congo -0.395 0.150 -0.001 1.605 3.651 (0.161) 
Djibouti -0.186 0.182 -1.157 4.577 14.704*** (0.001) 
Egypt -0.211 0.100 0.886 3.058 5.899* (0.052) 
Equatorial Guinea -0.927 0.446 -0.689 1.725 6.614** (0.037) 
Gabon -1.172 0.193 -1.251 4.401 15.419*** (0.000) 
Gambia -0.125 0.131 -0.338 6.226 20.367*** (0.000) 
Ghana -0.215 0.082 -1.400 5.967 31.213*** (0.000) 
Guinea -0.049 0.088 -1.033 2.987 8.005** (0.018) 
Guinea-Bissau -0.230 0.228 -0.819 2.080 6.615** (0.037) 
Kenya -0.311 0.067 -0.683 3.011 3.499 (0.174) 
Lesotho 0.239 0.150 0.327 2.270 1.802 (0.406) 
Liberia -0.219 0.324 0.686 3.039 3.534 (0.171) 
Libya -1.705 0.128 -0.764 4.981 11.736*** (0.003) 
Madagascar -0.139 0.061 0.136 2.443 0.722 (0.697) 
Malawi -0.253 0.102 -0.088 2.306 0.960 (0.619) 
Mali -0.161 0.140 0.894 3.172 6.051** (0.049) 
Mauritania -0.383 0.135 -0.318 2.422 1.384 (0.501) 
Mauritius -0.438 0.051 -0.387 3.840 2.447 (0.294) 
Morocco -0.538 0.046 0.288 2.425 1.240 (0.538) 
Mozambique -0.046 0.199 -0.379 1.459 5.529* (0.063) 
Namibia -0.506 0.121 0.289 2.862 0.661 (0.719) 
Niger -0.432 0.181 -1.429 3.849 16.676*** (0.000) 
Nigeria -0.299 0.126 0.635 4.426 6.837** (0.033) 
Rwanda -0.020 0.169 0.032 2.166 1.310 
Sao Tome and Principe -0.023 0.135 0.180 2.168 1.541 (0.463 
Senegal -0.220 0.038 1.094 4.817 15.163*** (0.001) 
Seychelles -1.030 0.386 -2.393 10.513 148.794*** (0.000) 
Sierra Leone -0.135 0.067 0.227 2.205 1.572 (0.456) 
Somalia -0.359 0.076 0.498 4.690 7.214** (0.027) 
South Africa -0.571 0.099 -0.190 1.664 3.616 (0.164) 
Swaziland -0.649 0.310 -0.216 2.127 1.778 (0.411) 
Tanzania -0.629 0.268 -1.022 2.493 8.314** (0.016) 
Togo -0.277 0.182 -0.147 1.925 2.331 (0.312) 
Tunisia -0.486 0.049 -0.693 3.691 4.502 (0.105) 
Uganda -0.293 0.047 -0.672 3.350 3.612 (0.164) 
Zambia -0.062 0.174 -0.177 2.948 0.240 (0.887) 
Zimbabwe -0.159 0.235 0.534 2.625 2.399 (0.301) 
Note: ***, ** and * denote the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. The logarithmic form of the series are reported in this Table. 
 
Figure-1: Consumption in Africa 
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Figure 2: Normalized LAPC of 25 African countries (Algeria – Liberia) 
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Figure 3: Normalized LAPC of 25 African countries (Libya – Zimbabwe) 
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-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
1972 1978 1984 1990 1996 2002 2008 2014
Togo
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
1972 1978 1984 1990 1996 2002 2008 2014
Tunisia
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
1972 1978 1984 1990 1996 2002 2008 2014
Uganda
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
1972 1978 1984 1990 1996 2002 2008 2014
Zambia
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
1972 1978 1984 1990 1996 2002 2008 2014
Zimbabwe
 
3.2 Unit root test 
 
 
The RALS test of Meng et al. (2014) considers a three-step procedure to identify breaks and 
test for a unit root. It basically adds an additional step to the two-step LM test of Lee et al. 
(2012). The first step examines the occurrence of structural breaks in the series, while the 
second step involves testing for a unit root. To identify and test the significance of breaks, the 
test adopts a maximum F (maxF) test. Then, since the location and/or existence of breaks are 
known following the first step, the unit root test is adopted in the second step. This is 
important because tests with exogenously determined breaks have greater power than those 
where breaks are endogenously identified
4
. In the last step, the information on non-normal 
errors is introduced into the model in a bid to further boost the reliability of the LM statistic. 
 
The RALS-LM unit root test can be conducted with the following equation: 
 
' * '
1 ,
1
ˆ
k
t t t j t j t t
j
y Z S d S w u   

                                                  (2) 
𝑦𝑡 is the logarithm of the APC.   is the difference operator. k  is the optimal lag length. 
𝛿′contains the coefficients of the exogenous series. tZ  is a vector of exogenous variables, 
which can be specified as * * * *
11
1, , ,..., , ,...,t Rt t RttZ t D D DT DT
 
 
where *
1tD  is the dummy variable 
that captures the first change in the intercept and *
1tDT  is the dummy variable that captures 
the first change in the slope. R is the number of breaks. Hence, *
1
1
t
D  for t 1,  1,..., ,BT i R    and 
0, otherwise, and *
1 Bit
DT t T   for t 1BT   and 0 otherwise. BiT captures the breaks’ locations 
(for one country). The null of the unit root is tested using ϕ=0 and the RALS-LM statistic (
 RALS-LM) is produced through the normal least square method, which is utilised to 
analyse Eq. (2). *tS denotes the transformed form of the detrended variables, ,t t tS y Z   
and   is constant. The transformation is required to eliminate the dependency of the test 
statistic on the nuisance parameter (see Lee et al., 2012 for more details). In the case of the 
dual shifts in the trend, R=2. ˆ tw is the variable that contains the information of non-normal 
errors that augments the LM procedure.   is the coefficient of the non-normal errors. In the 
LM test of Lee et al. (2012), 0   and the t-statistic for 0   is denoted by *
LM . The lagged 
terms of t jS   are used in the regressions to make sure that there is no serial correlations in 
the equation. 
 
4. Empirical findings. 
 
                                                          
4
 “It should be noted that exogenously determined breaks relies on more restrictive 
assumption because they assume that the break dates are known beforehand.” 
Table-2 reports the results from the application of the LM and RALS-LM unit root tests with 
two breaks to the logarithm of the APC (LAPC) for our sample of 50 African countries. We 
use a 10% level of significance when drawing all inference for all tests that we apply. The 
unit root null is rejected in all countries using the LM test and in 45 out of 50 countries using 
the RALS-LM test. The 5 countries where the RALS-LM test indicates non-stationarity are 
Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Madagascar, Mozambique and Namibia. Following Meng et al. 
(2013) we further examine the significance of the identified trend breaks used in the unit root 
tests reported in Table-2. For 45 countries two trend breaks are found to be significant. 
However, only one of the two specified structural breaks is significant in the tests applied to 
the following 5 countries: Cote D’Ivoire, Cape Verde, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and South 
Africa.  
 
Given that only one structural break is significant in some countries we also report the LM 
and RALS-LM unit root tests that specify just one break in Table-3. The null hypothesis of 
non-stationarity in LAPC is rejected in all the countries using the LM test and in 37 countries 
using the RALS-LM procedure. The countries for which LAPC is non-stationarity according 
to the latter test are Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Gambia, 
Kenya, Liberia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal and South Africa. Using both 
unit root tests the single structural break is significant for all countries.
5
 
 
Table-2: Two-Break LM and RALS-LM Unit Root Tests 
Country 
LM   
RALS-LM 
2ˆ  TB 
RALS-LM critical values 
  LM   RALS-LM  
Break 
(1) 
Break 
(2) 
1% 5% 10% 
Algeria 
-4.836*** [3]  
-5.760*** [3] 0.719 1984 2006 
-4.434 
-3.884 -3.605 
Angola 
-6.085*** [4]  
-6.306*** [4] 0.767 1995 2004 
-4.483 -3.945 -3.666 
Benin 
-6.181*** [4]  
-6.538*** [4] 0.771 1980 1984 
-4.487 -3.950 -3.671 
Botswana 
-5.663*** [3]  
-5.292*** [3] 0.999 1989 2007 
-4.688 -4.182 -3.920 
Burkina Faso 
-6.065*** [0]  
-9.102*** [0] 0.463 1975 1984 
-4.100 -3.525 -3.217 
Burundi 
-5.445*** [0]  
-5.856*** [0] 0.746 1979 1988 
-4.461 -3.918 -3.639 
Cabo Verde  
-6.136*** [3]  
-5.249*** [3] 0.633 1985& 2003 
-4.343 -3.780 -3.489 
Cameroon 
-6.322*** [1]  
-6.421*** [1] 0.854 1978 1981 
-4.573 -4.040 -3.767 
Central African Republic 
-5.680*** [1]  
-5.765*** [1] 0.896 1979 1993 
-4.616 -4.082 -3.813 
Chad 
-5.835*** [0]  
-7.546*** [0] 0.575 1981 1984 
-4.272 -3.704 -3.404 
Comoros 
-10.641*** [1]  
-10.790*** [1] 0.829 1993 1997 
-4.547 -4.016 -3.740 
Congo 
-8.298*** [3]  
-8.028*** [3] 0.995 1990 2000 
-4.686 -4.178 -3.916 
Cote D’Ivoire  
-5.444*** [4]  
-5.136*** [4] 0.891 1988& 1999 
-4.611 -4.077 -3.807 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
-6.301*** [0]  
-6.450*** [0] 0.780 1990 1993 
-4.496 -3.962 -3.683 
Djibouti 
-5.887*** [1]  
-5.232*** [1] 0.960 1988 1997 
-4.661 -4.144 -3.879 
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 Unreported results (available from the authors upon request) from the application of ADF, 
LM and RALS-LM tests without breaks to all countries’ LAPCs indicate rejection of the unit 
null in 35 countries according to the ADF test and 10 countries using the no-break LM and 
RALS-LM tests.  
Egypt 
-6.360*** [3]  
-6.455*** [3] 0.865 1975 1984 
-4.584 -4.051 -3.779 
Equatorial Guinea 
-2.484* [3]  
-2.361 [3] 0.730 1993 1996 
-4.445 -3.898 -3.619 
Gabon 
-4.487*** [3]  
-4.498** [3] 0.926 1975 1979 
-4.638 -4.111 -3.844 
Gambia 
-5.031*** [4]  
-5.355*** [4] 0.828 2001 2005 
-4.546 -4.015 -3.739 
Ghana 
-3.522*** [0]  
-3.496 [0]  0.961 1998 2000 
-4.662 -4.145 -3.880 
Guinea 
-6.985*** [0]  
-7.428*** [0] 0.798 2001 2007& 
-4.515 -3.984 -3.705 
Guinea-Bissau 
-6.912*** [4]  
-7.117*** [4] 0.877 1978& 1994 
-4.596 -4.063 -3.792 
Kenya 
-5.521*** [4]  
-4.796*** [4] 0.780 1984 1993 
-4.496 -3.962 -3.683 
Lesotho 
-6.510*** [4]  
-7.742*** [4] 0.730 1978 1992 
-4.445 -3.898 -3.619 
Liberia 
-11.556*** [0]  
-12.167*** [0] 0.840 2002 2005 
-4.558 -4.027 -3.752 
Libya 
-11.221*** [0]  
-12.862*** [0] 0.705 1979 1982 
-4.419 -3.866 -3.587 
Madagascar 
-3.574*** [0]  
-3.442 [0] 0.929 2000 2003 
-4.640 -4.114 -3.847 
Malawi 
-5.824*** [3]  
-5.305*** [3] 0.972 1992 1998 
-4.670 -4.156 -3.892 
Mali 
-5.611*** [3]  
-5.928*** [2] 0.631 1988 1995 
-4.341 -3.778 -3.486 
Mauritania 
-6.280*** [1]  
-6.004*** [1] 0.983 1975 1988 
-4.677 -4.167 -3.903 
Mauritius 
-6.418*** [3]  
-6.520*** [3] 0.385 1978 1986 
-3.966 -3.380 -3.063 
Morocco 
-5.326*** [0]  
-5.164*** [0] 0.998 1978 1981 
-4.688 -4.181 -3.919 
Mozambique 
-4.083*** [1]  
-3.033 [1] 0.604 1993 2001 
-4.312 -3.746 -3.449 
Namibia 
-3.960*** [0]  
-3.705 [0] 0.914 1979 1982 
-4.630 -4.100 -3.832 
Niger 
-6.805*** [3]  
-6.644*** [3]  0.894 1981 1994 
-4.614 -4.080 -3.810 
Nigeria 
-6.336*** [0]  
-5.691*** [0] 0.648 1999 2002 
-4.359 -3.798 -3.509 
Rwanda 
6.776*** [0]  
-7.786*** [0] 0.652 1993 1996 
-4.363 -3.803 -3.515 
Sao Tome and Principe 
-4.425*** [4]  
-4.193** [4] 0.934 1987 1990 
-4.643 -4.119 -3.852 
Senegal 
-7.086*** [0]  
-7.280*** [0] 0.857 1976 1982 
-4.576 
-4.043 -3.770 
Seychelles 
-6.435*** [0]  
-7.729*** [0] 0.563 2002 2005 
-4.255 -3.686 -3.385 
Sierra Leone 
-5.723*** [4]  
-5.958*** [4] 0.732 1998 2003 
-4.447 -3.901 -3.622 
Somalia 
-10.117*** [2]  
-14.534*** [2] 0.432 1977 1989 -4.046 -3.469 -3.158 
South Africa 
-4.763*** [3]  
-4.280** [3] 0.940 1977& 1992 -4.648 -4.125 -3.859 
Swaziland 
-7.121*** [1]  
-6.597*** [1] 0.837 1985 1995 -4.555 -4.024 -3.748 
Tanzania 
-5.536*** [1]  
-8.377*** [1] 0.341 1976 1985 -3.891 -3.286 -2.964 
Togo 
-6.498*** [1]  
-8.014*** [1] 0.651 1992 2006 -4.362 -3.802 -3.513 
Tunisia 
-3.855*** [2]  
-4.582*** [2] 0.673 1978 1983 -4.385 -3.828 -3.544 
Uganda 
-6.598*** [3]  
-7.485*** [3] 0.821 1992 1995 -4.539 -4.008 -3.731 
Zambia 
-6.310*** [4]  
-7.635*** [1] 0.548 1985 1994 -4.233 -3.663 -3.362 
Zimbabwe 
-6.273*** [4]  
-5.657*** [4] 0.802 1982 2005 -4.519 -3.989 -3.710 
Due to the fact that the LM test and RALS-LM test are similar in searching for the break points and the relevant optimal lags, we only report one time to 
conserve space. The optimal number of lagged first-differenced term is reported in the parenthesis. TB is the structural break point(s). & indicates that the 
trend break is not significant at 10%. The critical values for the LM test are -3.252, -2.579 and -2.229 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All 
the critical values are computed, using the codes provided in https://www.dropbox.com/sh/dnjpjqmmgfi4otu/AADNU7UVeqWjlNLxsoXn3gZWa?dl=0 
 For all the tests, the maximum lag is set at 4. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level. 
 
  
Table-3: One-Break LM and RALS-LM Unit Root Tests 
Country 
LM  
RALS-LM 
2ˆ  TB 
RALS-LM critical values 
  LM   RALS-LM  Break  1% 5% 10% 
Algeria 
-3.767*** [3]  
-3.533* [3] 0.973  1981 
-4.183 
-3.651 -3.382 
Angola 
-4.005*** [4]  
-4.940***  [4] 0.451  1989 
-3.739 -3.152 -2.839 
Benin 
- 3.796 *** [0]  
 -2.182 [0] 0.609 2000& 
-3.920 -3.351 -3.054 
Botswana 
-4.039*** [3]  
-4.252*** [3] 0.932 1988 
-4.158 -3.621 -3.350 
Burkina Faso 
-3.163*** [3]  
-4.568*** 0.565 1987 
-3.875 -3.299 -2.998 
Burundi 
-4.093*** [0]  
-7.547*** [0] 0.282 1998 
-3.496 -2.884 -2.547 
Cabo Verde 
-3.218*** [4]  
-3.562* [4] 0.885 2003 
-4.130 -3.586 -3.312 
Cameroon 
-2.922** [2]  
-2.767 [2] 0.553 2005 
-3.861 -3.284 -2.982 
Central African Republic 
-3.156*** [1]  
-2.695 [1] 0.762 1993 
-4.045 -3.487 -3.205 
Chad 
-2.491** [4]  
-2.079 [4] 0.570 1999 
-3.880 -3.306 -3.004 
Comoros 
-2.622** [3]  
-0.979 [3] 0.258 2007 
-3.456 -2.833 -2.494 
Congo 
-3.468*** [0]  
-3.503* [0] 0.812 1997 
-4.091 -3.530 -3.248 
Cote D‘Ivoire  
-3.917*** [4]  
-3.976** [4] 0.893 1999 
-4.134 -3.593 -3.319 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
-4.236*** [0]  
-4.073*** [0] 0.666 1986 
-3.958 -3.401 -3.117 
Djibouti 
-3.616*** [4]  
-4.121*** [4] 0.809 1992 
-4.090 -3.528 -3.245 
Egypt 
-4.585*** [3]  
-5.302*** [3] 0.706 1976 
-3.986 -3.436 -3.159 
Equatorial Guinea 
-4.704*** [0]  
-5.829*** [0] 0.574 1988 
-3.885 -3.311 -3.010 
Gabon 
-5.801*** [3]  
-5.049*** [3] 0.973 1980 
-4.183 -3.651 -3.382 
Gambia 
-3.762*** [3]  
-1.903 [3] 0.925 2001 
-4.153 -3.616 -3.345 
Ghana 
-5.016*** [1]  
-4.621*** [1] 0.974 1997 
-4.183 -3.652 -3.383 
Guinea 
-4.743*** [4]  
-5.649*** [0] 0.747 1999 
-4.029 -3.473 -3.193 
Guinea-Bissau 
-4.428*** [4]   
-5.926*** [4] 0.587 1994 
-3.899 -3.327 -3.027 
Kenya 
-2.857** [4]  
-1.952 [4] 0.836 1992 
-4.104 -3.549 -3.269 
Lesotho 
-4.287*** [3]  
-3.402* [3] 0.929 1978 
-4.156 -3.619 -3.348 
Liberia 
-5.611*** [4]  
-0.460 [4] 0.482 2002 
-3.779 -3.194 -2.885 
Libya 
-6.137*** [0]  
-3.600*** [0] 0.318 2000 
-3.552 -2.951 -2.618 
Madagascar 
-4.028*** [1]  
-3.522* [1] 0.941 2000 
-4.163 -3.628 -3.357 
Malawi 
-4.729*** [3]  
-5.828*** [3] 0.800 1992 
-4.085 -3.521 -3.237 
Mali 
-4.233*** [1]  
-5.792** [1] 0.517 1999 
-3.821 -3.239 -2.934 
Mauritania 
-2.938** [0]  
-3.127 [0] 0.916 1985 
-4.148 -3.610 -3.337 
Mauritius 
-4.287*** [0]  
-4.625*** [0] 0.700 1975 
-3.980 -3.431 -3.154 
Morocco 
-3.072** [0]  
-3.311* [0] 0.698 1999 
-3.979 -3.429 -3.152 
Mozambique 
-3.007** [0]  
-0.077 [0] 0.397 1994& 
-3.669 -3.078 -2.757 
Namibia 
-4.380*** [0]  
-4.394*** [0] 0.899 1986 
-4.137 -3.597 -3.324 
Niger 
-7.847*** [0]  
-9.922*** [0] 0.692 1981 
-3.975 -3.424 -3.145 
Nigeria 
-5.965*** [0]  
-8.059*** [0] 0.625 2000 
-3.931 -3.365 -3.072 
Rwanda 
-3.639*** [4]  
-0.543 [4] 0.625 1993& 
-3.931 -3.365 -3.072 
Sao Tome and Principe 
-3.505*** [4]  
-3.599** [4] 0.551 1980 
-3.859 -3.282 -2.979 
Senegal 
-3.752*** [4]  
-1.792 [4] 0.825 1986 
-4.098 -3.540 -3.259 
Seychelles 
-4.943*** [4]  
-4.956*** [0] 0.791 2002 
-4.076 -3.513 -3.230 
Sierra Leone 
-4.801*** [4]  
-4.882*** [4] 0.642 1988 
-3.942 -3.380 -3.090 
Somalia 
-4.449*** [3]  
-4.289*** [3] 0.515 1975 
-3.819 
-3.237 -2.932 
South Africa 
-3.496*** [1]  
-3.104 [1] 0.912 1994 
-4.145 -3.607 -3.334 
Swaziland 
-4.760*** [1]  
-4.547*** [1] 0.890 1985 
-4.133 -3.590 -3.316 
Tanzania 
-4.221*** [3]  
-4.832*** [3] 0.792 1981 
-4.077 -3.514 -3.230 
Togo 
-4.951*** [0]  
-4.220*** [0] 0.987 2006 
-4.191 -3.662 -3.393 
Tunisia 
-3.731*** [2]  
-3.408* [2] 0.948 1988 
-4.167 -3.633 -3.362 
Uganda 
-5.058*** [0]  
-5.034*** [0] 0.547 2001 
-3.855 -3.277 -2.974 
Zambia 
-3.247*** [0]  
-3.928** [0] 0.776 1991 
-4.060 -3.499 -3.217 
Zimbabwe 
-5.475*** [0]  
-5.496*** [0] 0.741 2005 
-4.023 -3.468 -3.188 
Due to the fact that the LM test and RALS-LM test are similar in searching for the break points and the relevant optimal lags, we only 
report one time to conserve space. The optimal number of lagged first-differenced term is reported in the parenthesis. TB is the structural 
break point(s). & indicates that the trend break is not significant at 10%. The critical values for the LM test are -3.252, -2.579 and -2.229 at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All the critical values are computed, using the codes provided in 
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/dnjpjqmmgfi4otu/AADNU7UVeqWjlNLxsoXn3gZWa?dl=0 
 For all the tests, the maximum lag is set at 4. ***,** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level. 
  
 
Since unit root tests are most powerful against the most appropriate alternative hypothesis for 
the data we will identify the most appropriate test based upon the evidence regarding the 
significance of structural breaks. Since the unit root tests based upon one break indicate that a 
structural break is evident in all countries we suggest that that we must assume at least one 
break for each country and base our inference on unit root tests that allow for at least one 
break. According to the tests that allow for two structural breaks both of these breaks are 
significant for 45 countries. Hence, we base our inference on whether LAPC has a unit root 
or is stationary around a trend with two breaks on the unit root tests that assume two breaks 
for these 45 countries. For the remaining 5 countries (Cote D’Ivoire, Cabo Verde, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau and South Africa) we base our inference on the tests that allow for one 
structural break. Whilst the LM test that allows for two breaks rejects the unit root null in all 
countries the corresponding RALS-LM test does not reject the null for the following 5 
countries where there are two evident breaks: Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Madagascar, 
Mozambique and Namibia. For the 5 countries where only one break is evident the LM test 
rejects the unit root null in all countries whereas the RALS-LM procedure cannot reject the 
unit root null in just one country, South Africa, and finds that LAPC is stationary around a 
single break for the remaining 4 countries. Using all of these results together we cannot 
discount the existence of a unit root in the LAPC for 6 of the 50 countries (Equatorial Guinea, 
Ghana, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa). For 4 countries we find 
evidence that the LAPC is stationary around a trend with a single break (Cote D’Ivoire, Cabo 
Verde, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau) while for remaining 40 countries the LAPC is stationary 
around a trend with two structural breaks. 
 
The foregoing analysis indicates the importance of allowing for structural breaks given that 
they are evident for all 50 African countries. Since the exclusion of structural breaks when 
they exist is known to reduce the power of rejecting a false unit root hypothesis it is 
important that such breaks be accounted for (as we have done) in any such tests to avoid this 
problem of low power.  
 
The support for the stationarity of LAPC around structural breaks is consistent with the work 
of Cook (2005), Romero-Ávila (2009) and Elmi and Ranjbar (2013) who apply unit root tests 
that allow for breaks to data from OECD countries. 
 
Although real consumption has greatly increased over the years in African countries, there 
has generally been a corresponding increase in real GDP. The changes in factors such as the 
inflation rate and the interest rate tend to have affected both consumption and income 
(Solarin and Anoruo, 2015) and have therefore had little impact on the APC in the long-run 
although there may be short-run divergences that possibly manifest themselves as structural 
breaks. Further, the growing availability of consumer credit, allowing households to increase 
living standards, may also have shifted the APC causing the breaks that we have found to be 
evident. Nevertheless, consumption and income generally do not appear to diverge (despite 
these breaks) given our finding that the LAPC of most African countries is stationary around 
structural breaks.  
 
Based on the two-break unit root tests, 95 significant structural breaks are identified with 27 
(28%) breaks occurring in the 1980s. This was a period in which several African countries 
witnessed very poor economic growth that led to their categorisation as underdeveloped 
(Solarin and Anoruo, 2015). The slow growth during this period was due to factors that 
include: poorly developed financial systems, incessant conflicts, low educational attainment, 
huge black-market exchange-rate premia and substantial budget deficits (Easterly and Levine, 
1997). Another 31 (32%) breaks are located in the 1990s, which was a period when many 
African countries started to experience high economic growth rates. The causes of the high 
economic growth rates in this period include economic reforms and the return to democracy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table-4: Analysis of the Break Dates 
Country 
 
First Break 
Kind of 
Shock 
Duration Anticipation  Second 
Break 
Kind of 
Shock 
Duratio
n 
Anticipatio
n 
Algeria 
 
1984 
Food crisis 1984-1988 Unexpected  
2006 
Oil prices 
Increase 
2006-
2008 
Unexpecte
d 
Angola 
 
1995 
Fragile 
Periods of 
Peace 
1995-1998 Unexpected  
2004 
Tax Reform 
 
2004-
2011 
Expected 
Benin 
 
1980 
New 
Democratic 
Dispensati
on 
1980-1984 Expected  
1984 
New 
Democratic 
Dispensation 
1984-
1991 
Expected 
Botswana 
 
1989 
Tax 
reforms 
1989-1992 Expected  
2007 
Global 
Financial 
Crisis 
2007-
2008 
Unexpecte
d 
Burkina Faso 
 
1975 
War with 
Mali 
1974-1975 Unexpected  
1984 
Tax Reforms 1984-
1987 
Unexpecte
d 
Burundi 
 
1979 
Major 
Outbreak 
of 
Dysentery 
1979-1988 Unexpected  
1988 
Brief Civil 
Conflict 
1988-
1988 
Unexpecte
d 
Cape Verde 
 
2003 
Privatisatio
n of State 
Utilities 
2003-Date Expected  
 
   
Cameroon 
 
1978 
Oil 
Exploitatio
n Started 
1978-Date Expected  
1981 
Start of the 
Excessive 
Indebtedness 
1981-
Date 
Unexpecte
d 
Central African 
Republic 
 
1979 
Overthrow
n of 
Governme
nt 
1979-1981 Unexpected  
1993 
Return to 
Democracy 
1993-
2003 
Expected 
Chad 
 
1981 
End of a 
Phase of 
Libya-
Chad 
Conflict 
1980-1981 Expected  
1984 
Drought 1984-
1985 
Unexpecte
d 
Comoros 
 
1993 
Elections 1993-1993 Expected  
1997 
Internal 
Conflict over 
Secession 
1997-
2001 
Expected 
Congo 
 
1990 
Multiparty 
Politics 
Started 
1990-1997 Expected  
2000 
More 
Economic 
Freedom 
2000-
Date 
Expected 
Cote D’Ivoire 
 
1999 
Tax 
Reforms 
1999-date Expected  
 
   
Democratic Republic 
of the Congo 
 
1990 
Reduction 
in World 
Bank 
Lending 
1990-1997 Unexpected  
1993 
Internal 
Conflict 
1993-
1997 
Unexpecte
d 
Djibouti 
 
1988 
Border 
Conflict 
Between 
Ethiopia 
and Eritrea 
1988-2000 Unexpected  
1997 
Privatization 1997-
Date 
Expected 
Egypt 
 
1975 
Tax 
Reforms 
1975-1981 Expected  
1984 
Parliamentary 
Election 
1984-
1987 
Expected 
Equatorial Guinea 
 
1993 
Parliament
ary 
Election 
1993-1999 Expected  
1996 
Large Scale 
Oil 
Production 
Starts   
1996- Unexpecte
d 
Gabon 
 
1975 
Joining 1975-1994 Expected  
1979 
Presidential 1979- Expected 
OPEC Election 1986 
Gambia 
 
2001 
Tax 
Reforms 
2001-date Expected  
2005 
New 
Restrictive 
Legislation 
2005-
2005 
Unexpecte
d 
Ghana 
 
1998 
Tax 
Reforms 
1998-Date Expected  
2000 
Tax Reforms 2000-
Date 
Expected 
Guinea 
 
2001 
Tax 
Reforms 
2001-date Expected  
 
   
Guinea-Bissau 
 
1994 
First Multi-
Party 
Election 
1994-1999 Expected  
 
   
Kenya 
 
1984 
Drought 1984-1985 Unexpected  
1993 
Tax Reform 1993-
1995 
Unexpecte
d 
Lesotho 
 
1978 
Debt 
written off 
by UK 
1978 Unexpected  
1992 
Tax Reform 1992-
Date 
Unexpecte
d 
Liberia 
 
2002 
Internal 
Conflict 
2002-2003 Expected  
2005 
Presidential 
Election 
2005-
2011 
Expected 
Libya 
 
1979 
Increase in 
oil Prices 
1979-1980 Unexpected  
1982 
Embargo 1982-
1999 
Unexpecte
d 
Madagascar 
 
2000 
Floods 2000-2000 Unexpected  
2003 
Political 
Crisis 
2002-
2003 
Expected 
Malawi 
 
1992 
Tax 
Reforms 
1992-1995 Expected  
1998 
Tax Reforms 1998-
1999 
Expected 
Mali 
 
1988 
Structural 
Reform 
Policies 
(Privatisati
on and 
Liberalisati
on) 
1988-1998 Expected  
1995 
Tax Reforms 1995-
Date 
Expected 
Mauritania 
 
1975 
Madrid 
Agreement 
(Spanish 
Sahara 
divided 
between 
Morocco 
and 
Mauritania 
1975-Date Expected  
1988 
Flooding 1988-
1988 
Unexpecte
d 
Mauritius 
 
1978 
Tax 
Reforms 
1978-1978 Unexpected  
1986 
Liberalisation 
of the 
Economy 
1986-
Date 
Expected 
Morocco 
 
1978 
Stabilizatio
n Triennial 
Plan 
1978-1980 Expected  
1981 
Drought 1981-
1993 
Unexpecte
d 
Mozambique 
 
1993 
Tax 
Reforms 
1993-Date Expected  
2001 
Flood 2000-
2001 
Unexpecte
d 
Namibia 
 
1979 
Namibian 
War of 
Independ
ence 
1979-1990 Unexpected  
1982 
Constitution
al Principles 
Agreed  
1982-
1990 
Expected 
Niger 
 
1981 
Food Crisis 1981-1983 Unexpected  
1994 
End of Civil 
Unrest With 
Tuareg 
Rebellion 
1990-
1994 
Expected 
Nigeria 
 
1999 
Return to 
Democratic 
Rule 
1999-date Expected  
2002 
Several Cases 
of Civil 
Unrest 
2002-
2002 
Unexpecte
d 
Rwanda 
 
1993 
Peace 
Agreement 
1990-1993 Expected  
1996 
Invasion of 
Congo DR by 
1996- Unexpecte
with 
Rwandan 
Patriotic 
Front 
Rwanda 1997 d 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
 
1987 
First 
Structural 
Adjustment 
Programme 
1987-1989 Expected  
1990 
Second 
Structural 
Adjustment 
Programme 
1990-
1992 
Expected 
Senegal 
 
1976 
Multi-party 
Democracy 
Starts 
1976-Date Expected  
1982 
Civil Conflict 
Start 
1982-
Date 
Unexpecte
d 
Seychelles 
 
2002 
Parliament
ary 
Election 
 
2002-2002 Expected  
2005 
Tax Reforms 2005-
Date 
Expected 
Sierra Leone 
 
1998 
Foreign 
Forces 
Invade the 
Country 
1998-1998 Expected  
2003 
Reduction In 
Foreign Aid 
2003-
2003 
Unexpecte
d 
Somalia 
 
1977 
War with 
Ethiopia 
1977-1978 Unexpected  
1989 
Insurgency 1989-
1990 
Unexpecte
d 
South Africa 
 
1994 
End of 
Apartheid 
1994-Date Expected  
 
   
Swaziland 
 
1985 
Depreciatio
n of the 
Currency 
1985-Date Unexpected  
1995 
Tax Reforms 1995-
1995 
Expected 
Tanzania 
 
1976 
Tax 
Reform 
1976-1985 Expected  
1985 
Tax Reform 1985-
1985 
Expected 
Togo 
 
1992 
Political 
Unrest 
1992-1993 Unexpected  
2006 
Tax Reforms 2006-
Date 
Expected 
Tunisia 
 
1978 
Labour 
Riots 
1978-178 Unexpected  
1983 
Bread Riots 1983-
1984 
Unexpecte
d 
Uganda 
 
1992 
High 
Inflation 
rate (52%) 
1992-1992 Expected  
1995 
New 
Constitution 
1995-
Date 
Expected 
Zambia 
 
1985 
Tax 
Reforms 
1985-1986 Expected  
1994 
Tax Reforms 1994-
Date 
Expected 
Zimbabwe 
 
1982 
Civil 
conflict 
1982-1987 Expected  
2005 
Parliamentary 
Election 
2005-
2005 
Expected 
 
 An analysis of the identified structural breaks is summarized in Table-4. It is noted that about 24 
breaks (or 25% of the total breaks) are associated with the tax reforms in Table-4. The observed 
breaks are not consistent with Ricardian equivalence, which argues that tax changes do not affect 
current consumption. According to Ricardian equivalence, the substitution of a budget deficit for 
current taxes has the same consequence on aggregate demand. A reduction in taxes by the 
government results into a budget deficit with the possibility of future tax increases. According to 
the hypothesis, rational consumers are aware that these future taxes have a present value equal to 
the incurred debt. The consumers therefore see through the intertemporal veil, saving additional 
disposable income to pay the future taxes instead of increasing their consumption (Mosikari and 
Eita, 2017). 
 
Our findings do not appear to follow any identifiable pattern according to country characteristics. 
For example, the countries with stationary LAPCs include non-oil rich countries (such as Kenya 
and Lesotho) as well as oil-rich nations (such as Nigeria and Libya). Burundi and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, which experienced prolonged internal strife, have stationary LAPCs like 
peaceful nations such as Zambia. Fragile states (Jones, 2013) such as Guinea, Guinea Bissau, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Togo and non-fragile states (Benin and Morocco) all have 
stationary LAPCs. Whilst in terms of size, relatively large countries (Morocco and Nigeria) and 
small countries (Benin and Lesotho) all have stationary LAPCs. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The previous literature on testing for the order of integration of the APC has concentrated on 
developed countries and there is very little work on African countries. These papers generally 
demonstrate the need to account for structural breaks if the theoretically expected finding of a 
stationary APC is to be obtained. Obtaining the correct inference is important because, for 
example, the presence (lack) of mean reversion implies that shocks are likely to have transitory 
(permanent) effects on the APC. The aim of this paper is to test for a unit root in the APC using 
methods that allow for structural breaks in 50 African countries over the period 1970-2014. We 
therefore contribute to the literature by testing the APC’s order of integration in a large number 
of African countries on which there is no such evidence. Another contribution is in the use of the 
residual augmented least squares (RALS) procedure of Meng et al. (2014) that provides for non-
linearity, asymmetry, or fat-tailed distributions in the testing process for unit roots that also allow 
for structural breaks. 
 
Our results provide evidence that the LAPC is stationary around structural breaks in 44 of the 50 
African countries considered (or 88% of the total sample) where the 6 countries that show 
evidence of non-stationarity are Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia 
and South Africa. These findings are broadly consistent with consumer theory that generally 
predicts the APC should be stationary in the sense that it is relatively constant or tends towards a 
constant, if there are a range of factors that can shift the constant that the APC converges to. The 
evident mean reversion implies that (policy) shocks are likely to have temporary effects on the 
APC in most African countries. The results are also in line with predictions from the literature on 
the “great ratios” of a stationary APC in the long-run (Romero-Ávila, 2009). Moreover, our 
results suggest that any empirical exercise which assumes that the APC is stationary will unlikely 
be subject to spurious inferences.  
 
One of the implications of the results is that the permanent income hypothesis is true for African 
countries as against the Absolute Income Hypothesis. The permanent income hypothesis is 
known to assist in the explanation of the failure of transitory Keynesian demand management 
techniques to achieve its policy targets. Within the framework of absolute income hypothesis, the 
marginal propensity to consume is assumed constant, and so temporary tax cuts can have a large 
stimulating effect on demand. However, the permanent income hypothesis framework suggests 
that a consumer will spread out the gains from a temporary tax cut over a long horizon, and so 
the stimulus effect will be much smaller. However, a permanent tax reduction will be effective 
because it would facilitate a permanent income increase, which would ensure that the stimulus 
effect will be resounding.  
Moreover, the results also imply that it would be very difficult for the authorities to use policies 
expected by the people to alter future consumption. Unexpected changes in policy affect 
consumption as everything known about future changes in policy is already incorporated in the 
present situation. Unexpected changes in policy affect consumption only to the extent that they 
affect permanent income and then their effects are expected to be permanent (Hall, 1978).  
 
An additional implication of the stationarity of the APC is that monetary policy is likely be more 
efficient in affecting current consumption than fiscal policy (Baykara and Telatar, 2012). 
Through wealth effects, a loose monetary policy that reduces interest rates may stimulate asset 
values, including private and government bonds as well as corporate stocks or equities, thereby 
boosting consumption. However, stock markets in Africa are small, largely underdeveloped and 
illiquid and constant trading is only experienced in the few stocks that are responsible for a 
significant portion of the total market capitalization (Solarin and Dahalan, 2014). Therefore, to 
ensure that the transmission mechanism through which monetary policies affect consumption is 
effective African authorities need to boost the development of stock markets.  
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